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u.s. INDIAN POLICY, 1865 ..1890
AS ILLUMINATED THROUGH THE LIVES OF
CHARLES A. EASTMAN AND ELAINE GOODALE EASTMAN

GRETCHEN CASSEL EICK

Plains, to protect the thousands of migrants
enticed there by Congress's offer through the
Homestead Act of 160 acres-free, contingent
upon living on it and making improvementsand by the marketing campaigns of railroads
that promised prosperity to those who followed
the rails.
These twenty-five years were a watershed
time for two regions-the South and the Great
Plains. In the South the federal government
would struggle with what to do with four million freed people and shift policy frequently
from 1865 to 1877, Washington, DC, would
award citizenship rather than land to black
men through the Fourteenth and Fifteenth
amendments to the Constitution in 1868 and
1870, but ultimately trade away federal government protection of citizenship rights for
black Americans for Republican control of the
White House in February 1877, three months
after the nation's most contentious election.
This infamous election gave home rule to
southern states, allowing them to determine
who voted and who didn't and to set their own
regulations for their largest minority group
even when those regulations violated the U.S.
Constitution. Beginning in 1877, for the next

Rapid change, passionate convictions, acute
regional differences, ethnic conflict, and an
army looking for a mission characterized the
United States from 1865 to 1890. The Civil
War was over and most of the soldiers had
mustered out and gone home. The others
were assigned either to the South to oversee
reconstruction or, the larger number of them,
to the area between the Mississippi and the
Rocky Mountains-the Great Plains. The U.S.
Army's new mission was to "pacify" the Great
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eighty years federal troops would not be dispatched to the South to ensure enforcement
of the Fourteenth and Fifteenth amendments'
guarantees of equal protection, due process,
and the right to vote to all citizens, without
regard to color or race.
In the Great Plains the federal government engaged in a parallel struggle over what
to do with 300,000 Native Americans.! That
struggle preoccupied the Department of War,
the Department of the Interior, Congress, and
Indian reformers from 1865 to 1890. 2 Congress
established federal agencies in both the South
and in the Plains to implement policy toward
blacks and Indians, respectively: the Bureau for
Refugees, Freedmen, and Abandoned Lands
in the South and the Bureau of Indian Affairs
for the West. Ultimately the Great Plains, like
the South, would be awarded home rule, and
those reformers who promoted citizenship and
assimilation as the answer to the region's mix
of ethnic groups would be succeeded by new
reformers and politicians ready to relegate
Native Americans, like black Americans, to
an inferior status unprotected by the federal
government and at the mercy of the new western state governments. This change in Indian
policy, however, came later than the parallel
change in African American policy.
In this essay I examine US. Indian policy
from the end of the Civil War to 1890 and
how it is illuminated by the life and writings of
physician, author, and Indian activist Ohiyesa,
a.k.a. Charles Alexander Eastman, and the
author and activist he would marry in 1891,
Elaine Goodale Eastman.
The Eastmans experienced the US. government's Indian policy directly during these
years, and both wrote extensively about their
experiences. Ohiyesa became a refugee at age
four when a desperate war by his Dakota nation
against the US. in 1862 resulted in the Dakota
being expelled from Minnesota and losing payment for the 23 million acres of land they had
ceded by treaty to the US. He lived in desperate poverty in exile in Canada for eleven years.
He experienced the US. policy of assimilation beginning at age fifteen when he moved

to Flandreau, SD, with his father and began
acquiring "white education" that took him east
to university and medical school while some of
his family members participated in the Great
Sioux War resisting colonization. In 1890 he
returned to the Great Plains to be the first
Indian physician at Pine Ridge Agency where
he experienced the Wounded Knee Massacre.
He would later become the best known Native
American of his era, author of eleven books
and several dozen articles, lecturer, lobbyist,
and civil servant. Elaine Goodale was a EuroAmerican teacher living among the Lakota
in the late 1880s. She knew participants in
the Ghost Dance revival and Euro-American
reformers like General Richard H. Pratt who
started the Indian boarding school movement.
Before and after marrying Ohiyesa/Charles
she wrote and spoke about how Indians were
treated and her firsthand experiences among
the Lakota.
This article lays out U.S. Indian policy
toward the Great Plains during the twentyfive years after the Civil War by examining
chronologically specific "players" that shaped
and reshaped that policy: the US. Army, the
President and Interior Department, Congress,
religious organizations, whites in the Indian
reform movement, settlers surging west, railroads, and the native nations of the Great
Plains, particularly the Lakota. Into the narrative of this changing policy the experiences of
the Eastmans are interjected, marked in italics,
to illustrate how this changing colonial policy
affected those being colonized. The macro is
intersected by the micro, as it were, to provide
a different way of "seeing" Indian policy and its
impact by viewing it through the eyes of these
two people.
GRANT'S PEACE POLICY IN THE SOUTHERN
PLAINS

In mid-1867, two years after the end of the
Civil War, Congress established a commission
of military men and civilians to make peace
with Plains tribes and get their agreement
to move to reservations. This U.S. Indian
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Commission would negotiate treaties with
chiefs and select reservations for those not
already on reservations; if they failed to secure
peace through negotiations, Congress authorized the secretary of war to suppress Indian
hostilities with volunteer soldiers called up
for this purpose. 3 The commission included
the army general in charge of maintaining
peace on the frontier, Gen. William Tecumseh
Sherman, nationally known for his massively
destructive march across Georgia and through
the Carolinas in the last year of the Civil War.
The commission negotiated a peace agreement
with the Kiowa, Kiowa-Apache, Arapaho,
Comanche, and Cheyenne at Medicine Lodge
Creek at Medicine Lodge in Kansas in 1868.
The commission, however, was less successful with the Lakota, the western Sioux of the
northern Great Plains. Sioux is an umbrella
term invented by French trappers to refer to
the Lakota (western), Nakota (central), and
Dakota (eastern or Santee) people who spoke
a common language and shared a common
culture. Deconstructed, "Sioux" means "the
enemy," not an objective descriptor. I use
Dakota/Lakota interchangeably with Sioux to
refer to these people who populated the area
from Minnesota west to the Rocky Mountains
and from Canada south to Kansas.
US. RELATIONS WITH NATIVE AMERICANS
OF THE NORTHERN GREAT PLAINS BEFORE
THE CIVIL WAR
In 1851 the United States had signed a
treaty with the Sioux, Arapaho, and Northern
Cheyenne at Fort Laramie that specified the
territory of each tribe and called for intertribal
peace. In exchange for fifty years of annuity
payments totaling $50,000, the tribes recognized that the United States could build roads
and military posts on these reservations and
would allow the safe passage of settlers through
their land. 4 Historian Jeffrey Ostler writes that
the Sioux had little experience with treaties,
relied on translation by traders, and probably
thought they were agreeing to all that had
been said by both sides in the negotiations.
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Moreover, only three of the seven council fires
of the Lakota/Sioux signed. In what would
become typical of colonial strategies, US. government officials ordered the Sioux to choose
a "head chief," which violated their collaborative, horizontal political structure for decision
making and was confusing to say the least. 5
Consequently, in the years that followed, the
Lakota occasionally harassed settlers traveling
through their land, and in 1855 Gen. William
S. Harney moved into the area with 600 armed
soldiers to punish "hostile" Sioux and ordered
them to convene and to sign a treaty he would
dictate. The Lakota in turn held a council in
1856 attended by at least 5,000 and possibly as
many as 10,000. There they agreed that only
traders could travel in the area and no roads or
forts could be constructed; they would defend
their western territory, and their bands would
sign no future treaties. 6 With the US. Army
preoccupied with subduing Indian resistance in
the Southern Plains, an uneasy impasse characterized the Northern Plains. In the 1860s
impasse changed to full-scale war'?
THE NORTHERN PLAINS AFTER THE US.
CIVIL WAR

By 1865 Euro-Americans commonly viewed
the Sioux/Lakota as the "enemy" because the
Dakota Santee Sioux in Minnesota went to
war against white settlers in 1862. Called the
Dakota War, it was the largest Indian uprising
in US. history. In 1865, the Lakota/Dakota
nation was divided internally between those
who saw military resistance as the only hope of
holding onto their land, and those who viewed
such resistance as futile and counterproductive, likely to bring more suffering upon people
already devastated by the retribution taken
against the Dakota by the US. Army and settlers in the years since the Dakota Uprising.
Meanwhile, the U.S. Army constructed
forts on the outer edges of the reserved Lakota
land: Fort Randall in 1856, Fort Abercrombie
in 1857, Fort Wadsworth in 1864, Fort Buford
in 1866, a rebuilt Fort Sully farther up river in
1866, Fort Stevenson in 1867, Fort Ransom in

30

GREAT PLAINS QUARTERLY, WINTER 2008

1867, and Fort Totten in 1867, as well as Sidney
Barracks and Forts D. A. Russell, Sanders,
and Fred Steele. 8 Lakota like Red Cloud
objected vociferously to this proliferation of
military installations in their area. In 1868
the Lakota and other tribes signed a treaty at
Fort Laramie in which the federal government,
acceding to Red Cloud's demand, agreed to
close three of the forts it had built to guard
the route along the Bozeman Road to the gold
fields in Montana. In exchange, the Lakota
and Northern Cheyenne agreed to stay in an
area that corresponds to today's South Dakota
while reserving the right to hunt in Wyoming
and Montana. Lakota leaders Spotted Tail
and Red Cloud refused to locate where the
U.S. military wanted them to settle, along the
Missouri River, moving their base communities
the way they traditionally had done. Red Cloud
remained with the Lakota who had not signed
the treaty. According to Jerome A. Greene's
2005 study of Fort Randall, both men in 1870
went to Washington, DC, t.o negotiate for their
own separate agencies and were successful, the
U.S. government establishing the Spotted Tail
and Red Cloud agencies. But the Lakota leaders continued to face serious problems from the
U.S. presence in the Great Plains: buffalo rapidly disappearing, burial grounds raided by U.S.
officials who stole skulls for the Army Medical
Museum, and hundreds of starving Indians
roaming the area. 9
By 1869 when Ulysses S. Grant became
president, responsibility for crafting Indian
policy lay with an uneasy alliance of Christian
evangelical reformers working with the Indian
Bureau of the Department of the Interiormen who considered themselves friends of the
Indian-and U.S. military men assigned by
Congress to pacify the Plains. Grant straddled
a leg on each side of this alliance. In his inaugural address that year, Grant included these
words: "I will favor any course toward them
[Indians] which tends to their civilization
and ultimate citizenship."lo Meanwhile, he
continued to appoint more military men than
Christian reformers to be Indian agents, despite
lobbying by activist Christian Indian reform

organizations to do the opposite. Within a
year of his inauguration, Congress relieved the
president of this inconsistent behavior by legislating that military men could not fill civilian
posts.!l
Congress shifted Indian policy to civilian
control and established a special relationship
between the U.S. government and the nation's
Christian churches, regardless of constitutional
provisions guaranteeing the separation of
church and state. In 1870 Congress authorized
the churches to appoint up to ten commissioners
to the Board of Indian Commissioners. These
commissioners would serve without pay and
exercise oversight, visiting reservations, ensuring that contracts to provide goods to Indians
[annuities] were not gouging the Indians,
and that the distribution of these goods was
equitable. By 1872, all Indian agencies were
allocated among the Protestant religious groups
that served on the Board of Commissioners. For
at least ten years-while Republicans held the
White House-these religious groups would
oversee the Indian agencies that administered
reservations l2 (see Fig. 1).
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FIG. 1. The Structure of
Authority over Native
Americans. * Rapid turnover was the norm for these
positions.
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Ohiyesa had been four years old in 1862 when
the Dakota Uprising in Minnesota brought such
devastation to the Dakota people, whether they participated in the uprising, opposed it and protected
whites, or tried to remain nonpartisan. Retribution
was swift and harsh and made no such distinctions: all Dakota were removed from Minnesota,
their annuities canceled altogether, 303 Dakota
men were scheduled to be hanged, and hundreds of
Dakota families fled north to take uncertain refuge
in Manitoba, Canada. Ohiyesa with his grandmother and uncle were among those refugees.
After more than a decade as a refugee in
Canada, Ohiyesa's life underwent radical reorganization in 1873. He was fifteen when, returning
home, he discovered two Indians in white men's
clothing speaking with his uncle. One of them was
actually his father, who in 1862 had been "under
sentence of death" but "against whom no evidence
was found, and who [was] finally pardoned by
President Lincoln." His father brought surprising
news:
"Your brothers have adopted the white man's
way; I came for you to learn this new way,
too; and I want you to grow up a good man."
He had brought me some civilized clothing. . .
all myoId ideas were to give place to new ones,
and my life was to be entirely different from
that of the past. ... Late in the fall we reached
the citizen settlement at Flandreau, South
Dakota, where my father and some others
dwelt among the whites. 13
Ohiyesa's name was changed to Charles
Alexander Eastman. His father, after serving a
prison sentence for the Dakota War, now called
himself Jacob Eastman. With a group of Dakota
Jacob had walked to Flandreau on the Dakota/
Minnesota border. They successfully applied to
be homesteaders. If they could not prevent white
incursions on their land and the destruction of
their traditional culture, perhaps they could appropriate the most useful ways of the whites who were
moving west and like the whites receive 160 acres
free to farm. That is what Jacob Eastman did
and it seemed to work for his family. His children
received a formal, "white" education, two of his

31

sons earning advanced degrees. The Dakota community in Flandreau continues to thrive in 2007.
Charles's father's choice of assimilating modeled
what the Christian Indian reformers envisioned as
the ideal pattern for all Native Americans-adaptation to "white" culture, adoption of Christianity,
adoption of agriculture (ironically, the Dakota
had been farmers traditionally in Minnesota),
"white education," and development of what steel
industrialist Andrew Carnegie in his Gospel of
Wealth would call "intense individualism."
TI-IE STRUCTURE OF U.S. COLONIAL
GOVERNANCE OF NATIVE AMERICANS BY

1880
The Christian reformers overseeing the
Indian agencies in the 1870s and early 1880s
worried about the caliber of agents on the
reservations.1 4 There was much opportunity
to profit at the Indians' expense if an agent
did not have integrity. According to Francis
Prucha, a renowned scholar of Indian policy,
"Supplying goods to the Indians [was] a
multimillion-dollar business by the 1870s."15
Congress passed a law in 1873 promoted
by reformers establishing five independent
inspectors who would visit agencies, inspect
the goods purchased with Indians' annuities,
and have the power to remove incompetent
or corrupt agents and appoint their replacements. 16 The partnership between the Indian
Bureau and the churches and religious groups
was based on the belief that corruption would
stop if churches nominated agents with genuine commitment to serving Indians, clergy
or laymen for whom salary was not a major
motivation. However, low salaries for agents
contributed to high turnover. In just one
year, 1878, there were thirty-five new agents
at the seventy-four agencies. While the U.S.
government paid the travel expenses of the
employees on the reservations, it provided no
subsistence and sometimes no residence. The
top reservation official, the agent, received a
salary of $1,500 a year, which was inadequate
for those bringing their families to live at the
agency, the Indian commissioners frequently
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reported to Congress in the 1870s. Also, commissioners of Indian affairs, who were the
chief executives of the Indian Bureau of the
Department of the Interior, held their jobs
only briefly; there were ten commissioners in
the fifteen years following the Civil War. Such
rapid turnover contributed to multiple shifts in
policy and lack of clarity for both officials and
the indigenous people they tried to control.
ASSIMILATION

Assimilation was a major goal of Indian
policy, with multiple strategies for achieving it. One strategy urged by the military
and authorized by Congress in 1878 was the
establishment of a reservation police force of
Indians that would model assimilation: Indian
police dressed "white," practiced monogamy,
received guns and horses, oversaw distribution of rations and construction of roads and
irrigation ditches, took the reservation census,
and arrested Indians accused of minor crimes
like drunkenness, wife beating, and theft. In
short, Indian police who would implement
U.S. Indian policy on the reservations had a
special elite status that reservation Indians
would want to emulate, proponents believed.
Agencies were quick to add Indian police. Two
years after Congress authorized Indian police,
forty agencies had them, and by 1890, fiftynine.
Another strategy to promote assimilation
was to establish Indian courts beginning
in 1883. These courts had jurisdiction over
those aspects of traditional Indian culture
most abhorred by the reformers, the military,
and the settlers alike-dances, polygamy,
and medicine men who tried to interfere
with the government's civilization program.
Indian courts also heard cases of destruction
of property, theft, liquor traffic, intoxication,
and misdemeanors, but this experiment in selfgovernment was limited by the regulation that
"the Agent had to approve all court decrees
with the Commissioner of Indian Affairs as the
ultimate arbiter in case of disputes."!7 Before
these Courts of Indian Offenses existed the

agent served as prosecutor and judge, with the
authority to charge, prosecute, and sentence
Indians on the reservation under his control.
The new courts brought a kind of indirect
rule, the federal government (Bureau of Indian
Affairs) governing through Indian tribal police
and Indian judges who retained their jobs as
long as their allegiance was to the white agent
rather than their tribe.1 8 The system was strikingly similar to the British colonial system
of administration, indirect rule, which gave
some limited local autonomy to indigenous
governing bodies but preserved ultimate power
to undermine their decisions to the colonial
government.
EDUCATION, ONE ROAD TO ASSIMILATION

Education was critical if Indians were to
assimilate-to become self-supporting, to
embrace intense individualism, and to give up
their traditional tribal cultures. Yet thirteen
years after the Civil War there were only 2,589
spaces in boarding schools for Indian children
and 33,000 Indian children to be educated.
There were reservation day schools, but policy
makers preferred boarding schools because they
removed children from their families, language,
and culture and were viewed as more effective
in "'de-tribalizing" children and teaching them
the acquisitiveness that characterized capitalist
America in the last quarter of the nineteenth
century.1 9
Charles Eastman wrote about his experience
with schools for Indian children even though his
family's multiethnic homesteading community
at Flandreau was not a reservation. At fifteen,
Eastman moved from Canada to Flandreau,
South Dakota, to join his father, who sent him
to the local school to learn English. The other
children taught him about assimilation in his first
conversation with them:

Charles: "Yes, this is my own pony. My uncle
in Canada always used him to chase the buffalo
and he has ridden him in many battles." I spoke
with considerable pride.
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[Another boy]: "Well, as there are no more
buffalo to chase now, your pony will have to
pull the plow like the rest."
Charles wrote:
I was considerably interested in the strange
appearance of these school children. They all
had on some apology for white man's clothing. . . . The hair of all the boys was cut short,
and, in spite of the evidences of great effort
to keep it down, it stood erect like porcupine
quills. . .. [I]f I had to look like these boys in
order to obtain something of the white man's
learning, it was time for me to rebel. ... I had
seen nothing thus far to prove to me the good
of civilization . ... I must tell my father that I
cannot stay here. 2o
In 1874, at age sixteen, Charles Eastman left
Flandreau to go to a mission school for Dakota
children at the Dakota Agency in Nebraska, run
by a missionary friend of his father, Dr. Alfred L.
Riggs. He walked 150 miles to attend the school,
where his older brother was an assistant teacher.
The school was a vocational school similar to
Hampton Institute in Virginia, which had been set
up for African Americans after the Civil War and
included some Native American children by 1869.
Hampton's most famous graduate was Booker T.
Washington, who would become the best-known
black man from 1895 until his early death in 1915.
Charles Eastman/Ohiyesa would have the same
celebrity as Washington during his much longer
lifetime.
The Santee mission school in Nebraska was
run much like Hampton. Students were provided
with oxen and farming tools, books in Dakota and
English, a suit of American clothes, a white man's
bed, and a haircut. Charles noted the despair of
Indian children brought to the school and separated from their parents. He noted the exhaustion-perhaps it was depression-he felt from
the "weary repetition" of boarding-school life. But
with encouraging letters from his father he mastered English, and then, as he was about to leave
for Wisconsin to attend Beloit College, he learned
of his father's sudden death. In traditional Dakota

1865-1890
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culture he would have taken a year to mourn, but
there was no time for protracted mourning in the
new culture he was acquiring. He took the train to
Wisconsin rather than returning to Flandreau for
the funeraPl
With support from Presbyterian missionaries
among the Dakota, both Charles and his brother
John received scholarships to attend "white" colleges "back East." Charles spent three years at
Beloit College (1876-1879), then attended Knox
College, then Kimball Union and Dartmouth
(1883-1887), and finally Boston University
Medical School (1887-1890).
MILITARY PACIFICATION

If the first leg of Indian policy during the
post-Civil War era was "reservate," "civilize,"
and educate, the second leg was military pacification of the Plains. The so-called Peace Policy
adopted by President Grant and continued by
President Rutherford B. Hayes included a commitment to "exterminate" Indians who resisted
being removed again and again to smaller and
smaller reservations, those termed "hostiles."
The Great Plains erupted several times during
these decades in warfare between whites and
Indians and between Indians and Indians.
The treatment of Indian civilians by the
U.S. Army frequently fanned anger among
Indians and among white reformers as in the
1864 Sand Creek Massacre of 250 or so peaceable Cheyenne under Black Kettle in Colorado;
the 1867 attack on a Cheyenne village by Gen.
Wil~iam Scott Hancock; and Gen. Oliver
Howard's defeat of Chief Joseph of the Nez
Perce in 1877. Conversely, Indian treatment
of white soldiers and civilians fed anti-Indian
sentiment, for example, Crazy Horse's killing
of eighty-one U.S. soldiers in December 1866
(the Fetterman Massacre) and the Modoc of
California killing two U.S. peace commissioners in 1873. The Lakota defeat and killing of
Custer's regiment in 1876 was widely covered
in the media and eroded white easterners' sympathy for Indians.
By 1876 the U.S. Army had 15,412 soldiers
in the Great Plains. 22 Official policy from
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FIG. 2. Map of the Great Sioux Reservation and surrounding areas (1868-89). Courtesy of the Smithsonian
Institution, National Anthropological Archives, Wintercounts website: http://wintercountes.si.edu/htmL
version/pdfs/map.cmyk.pdf. Map adapted from the Handbook of North American Indians, Vol. 13: Plains, Pt.
1 and Pt. 2, p. 794, edited by Raymond]. DeMallie, general editor, William C. Sturtevant, published by the
Smithsonian Institution, 2001.

the White House under Grant and his successor, President Hayes, was that white settlers should be removed from Indian land.
However, in an area the size of continental
Europe, 15,412 soldiers probably could not
have effectively enforced these orders. With
their officers ambivalent at best about removing white settlers, these presidential directives

had little impact. 23 Gen. Philip Sheridan, who
had jurisdiction over the area from Canada
to Mexico and from the Mississippi River
through the Rockies, commanded two-thirds
of the army, and was in charge of the Indian
wars theatre. Sheridan believed that Indians
had to be "broken" before they could be "civilized."24 According to historian Henry E. Fritz,
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while many military men were sympathetic
ro using reservations to achieve assimilation
and education, few in the military liked being
under civilian Indian agents. They worked to
get the Indian Bureau transferred to the War
Department, perhaps because they worried
about losing employment once pacification
was completed. However, they were unable to
persuade Congress to make this change.
soldiers in the Plains also faced pressure from settlers in the West who wanted more
forts ro be built and more federal troops present. Settlers lobbied Congress, sometimes using
their state legislatures to communicate their
views; for example, Kansas demanded all reservations be removed from the state. Frederick
E. Hoxie notes that these western whites would
become increasingly important in formulating
Indian policy as new western states entered the
union. 25 Francis Prucha observed in The Great
Father:

us.

[Tlhe army used surprise attacks on Indian
villages, and sometimes it resorted to campaigns during the winter, when the Indians
were accustomed to curtail their operations
and were often ill-prepared to beat back an
attacker. Such tactics were "total war," for
the women and children were nearly always
intermingled with the fighting men. 26
President Grant sent a humanitarian commission to inform the Lakota that they must
relinquish the Black Hills and some other
land or the government would simply seize it.
The Black Hills were sacred to the Lakota, but
gold had been discovered in 1873, a time of
national economic depression in the United
States. Gold pulled economically depressed
whites to the Black Hills, despite their being
off limits by treaty, and Grant was unwilling
to support the Lakota's prior treaty rights
against the pressure of these Euro-American
migrants. Technically, the Fort Laramie
Treaty required 75 percent of adult males to
agree to any future changes to the treaty.
Only one in ten Lakota signed the agreement to relinquish this land, far short of the
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requirement. President Grant needed a new
strategy.27
According to Jeffrey Ostler's 2004 study,
The Plains Sioux and U.S. Colonialism from
Lewis and Clark to Wounded Knee, because the
US. Army had successfully waged war in the
Southern Plains from 1869 to 1873-against the
Apaches, Arapahoes, Cheyennes, Comanches,
and Kiowas, subduing their resistance to
moving onto reservations and becoming
dependents of the US. government-the army
could shift more of its forces north by 1874.
The availability of troops enabled the adoption
of a new strategy to gain control of that Black
Hills area that the Lakota had refused to sell.
President Grant ordered the army to pull out
of the Black Hills and no longer protect Indian
land there from miners seeking to flock to the
region. Knowing miners would surge into the
Black Hills and that the Lakota would fight
to keep them out, Grant planned to use the
expected Indian attacks on settlers and miners
as a pretext for US. military action against the
Northern Plains tribes and to demand that the
Black Hills be exchanged with the US. government for whatever payment the government
offered. Lakota bands who resisted and refused
to come to the agencies, the federal government centers for administering Indian policy
on reservations, would be considered hostile
and hunted down. Meanwhile, confined to
reservations with their food supply dependent
on US. supplies of rations, those Lakota and
their allies who were not at war with the US.
Army ~ould be "persuaded" to sign away the
Black Hills in order to get food. The United
States would use food as a weapon. 2S
In December 1875, the army announced
that "all Sioux who were not at the agencies
by January 31, 1876, would be hunted down
by the army and brought in by military force."
Those Lakota who refused to accept alteration
of their treaty and loss of the Black Hills held
out for more than a year of fighting, killing
twice as many enemy combatants as were killed
by the US. Army in what came to be known
as the Great Sioux War. 29 The United States
had given them one month in the middle of a

36

GREAT PLAINS QUARTERLY, WINTER 2008

Northern Plains winter in an area the size of
Europe to get the word that they must move
onto reservations or be targeted for extermination. Sitting Bull, Crazy Horse, Red Cloud, and
others opted to resist, and the Great Sioux War
began in early 1876.
When three columns of US. troops moved
onto Sioux land, the surprised Lakota killed
all the soldiers in the column led by Gen.
George Armstrong Custer, at Little Big Horn,
Montana, on June 25. This Lakota victory
intensified the US. Army's military campaign.
First Spotted Tail and then Red Cloud came
in to the agencies to make peace while Sitting
Bull and Crazy Horse went north, joining the
Dakota refugees in Manitoba for a time.
By September, the army had taken control
of the western Lakota agencies and "was in a
strong position to extract retribution."30 Many
Lakota who lived on the reservations were
ready to sign an agreement giving up the Black
Hills and their hunting grounds in Wyoming
and Montana in order to receive rations to
keep their people alive through the winter.
Gen. George Crook and Col. Nelson Miles
each led army units in the Great Sioux War.
Crook implemented a policy of divide and rule
to keep those on reservations from aiding those
militarily resisting. He chose Spotted Tail to be
the person with whom the US. Army would
work most closely and punished Red Cloud
because his sympathies were suspected to be
with the "militants" in the north. The army
made Spotted Tail "head chief of the Lakota,"
a position that did not exist among the
horizontally structured Lakota, who governed
themselves through councils of elders. General
Crook enlisted a total of 355 Indian scouts,
including 155 Sioux, to join him in fighting
Sitting Bull, Crazy Horse, and the others who
resisted US. invasion of their land in violation
of earlier treaties. Fighting through the winter
months of 1876-77, the 4,000 Indian refugees
attached to the resistors suffered terribly;
elders' stories are still told about this time. 31
By January 1877 many had given up and
gone onto the reservations. By May, the US.
forces suffered 283 dead and claimed 150

Indian deaths. Spotted Tail, Crazy Horse's
uncle, agreed to negotiate with Crazy Horse
and the others if he could offer them favorable
terms; he refused to go if all he could offer
was unconditional surrender. Authorized by
General Crook to offer them a new agency in
the north, Spotted Tail and Red Cloud went
to Crazy Horse's camp, and he agreed to surrender. With 700 Lakota women and children,
200 mounted warriors, and 2,000 horses, Crazy
Horse surrendered May 7, 1877, offering the
peace pipe to Crook's subordinate, a very serious commitment to peace in Lakota/Dakota
culture. In the end, the United States took
the Black Hills, reducing the Great Sioux
Reservation significantly. Four months later
Crazy Horse was murdered.
General Crook never requested a northern
reservation for Crazy Horse as he had promised
to do, and Crook sent Crazy Horse's Northern
Cheyenne allies to Indian Territory (OklahQma
today) despite their having been told they would
get their own northern reservation. Crook also
canceled a buffalo hunt he had authorized to be
held in August 1877. Mistranslation persuaded
Crook's subordinate that Crazy Horse intended
to "fight until not a white man is left," and
resulted in the decision to arrest him with the
help of Lakota band leaders and 400 Indians.
The likelihood was that Crazy Horse would be
confined in Florida in the Fort Marion prison.
When Crazy Horse realized what was happening, he struggled against those escorting him
and was stabbed by his old friend, Indian scout
Little Big Man. According to Ostler, the key
factor that aborted the peace Crazy Horse had
made with Crook was Crook's reneging on his
promise to secure a northern agency for Crazy
Horse. 32

During the fall of 1876, a few months after
Little Big Horn, Charles Eastman lived in Beloit,
Wisconsin, where the local newspaper printed a
story that he was the nephew of Sitting Bull, who
led Lakota warriors against the U.S. Army. In
fact, two of Charles's uncles had participated in
the killing of Custer's regiment. Local white children, who Charles called "savages," taunted him
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when he ventured out. "People were bitter against
the Sioux in those days . ... I was now a stranger
in a strange country, and deep in a strange life
from which I could not retreat." When he looked
for summer employment, a farmer he approached
for work ordered: "Get off from my farm just as
quick as you can! I had a cousin killed by your
people only last summer." At the same time, his
proficiency in English had improved dramatically
to the point where
for the first time [I] permitted myself to think
and act as a white man . ... This was my ambition-that the Sioux should accept civilization
before it was too late! I wished that our young
men might at once take up the white man's
way, and prepare themselves to hold office and
wield influence in their native states. 33
LAKOTA/DAKOTA RESISTANCE

The resistance of Great Plains Indians to
US. colonization took many forms. Some chose
to wage warfare against invaders of their land,
and when their people's suffering required relief,
to relocate voluntarily to Canada and to the
more remote areas of the western Plains. Crazy
Horse, Red Cloud, Sitting Bull, and many others
chose this path in the decade from 1867 to
1877. Others chose deliberately to assimilate, to
acquire the tools of the colonizer and use them
to make life better for their family and people.
The fathers of Charles Eastman/Ohiyesa and
Luther Standing Bear/Ota Nte followed this
route and understood it to require warriorlike courage. Some preserved their traditional
culture at all costs, retaining dress, language,
customs, and stories despite the derision they
often experienced from Euro-Americans and
Indians who chose to assimilate. Resistance also
was manifested in working within the reservation structure to expose its violence against
native people through advocacy to government
officials in Washington, DC.
During the late 1870s delegations of Lakota
leaders from each of the agencies traveled
repeatedly to Washington to negotiate with the
president and his officials. In September 1877
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a delegation including Red Cloud and Spotted
Tail, leaders of Oglala and Brule agencies,
respectively, on the Great Sioux Reservation,
told President Hayes and newspaper journalists that they desired citizenship and did not
want to be removed again. Spotted Tail told
the president, "You take our lands from us
... your people make roads and drive away
the game, and thus make us poor and starve
us."34 To move 9,000 Lakota to a new site on
the Missouri River as winter was approaching-what Hayes proposed for them-would
be devastating; removal to Indian Territory
(Oklahoma today)-advocated by some of
Hayes's military advisors-was totally unacceptable. They must be allowed to select their
own sites if their agencies had to be moved.
President Hayes agreed to allow them to select
permanent sites for their agencies wherever they
chose on the Great Sioux Reservation if they
would agree to go to the Missouri River for the
winter of 1877-78, since the government had
already expended money taking their rations and
annuity supplies to this location. They agreed.
Walking hundreds of miles to a temporary
location under US. military escort with temperatures well below freezing and with insufficient provisions produced resistance among the
Brules and Oglalas. By the end of November
both groups had halted about sixty miles short
of their assigned destination, and some had left
for Canada to join Sitting Bull, the Hunkpapa
Lakota leader who had received guarantees
from the Canadian government that it would
not allow the US. Army to pursue his band on
Canadian soil. In mid-February word arrived
that 'President Hayes had reversed course
and would not allow them to select their own
agency locations. Both groups had already
done so. By the following fall, 1878, they
decided to "force the issue" by removing to the
sites they had selected, sending the president a
message through their Indian agent that they
"do not do this to defy or hurt the feelings of
the Great Father, but because it is their duty
to do the best they can to protect their women
and children."35 Although military leaders
like General Sherman were outraged at this
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FIG. 3. Charles Eastman, class photo at Dartmouth College, c. 1887. Courtesy of The Essential
Charles Eastman (Ohiyesa), edited by Michael Oren
Fitzgerald (Bloomington, IN: World Wisdom, 2007).

insubordination, the executive branch chose
to go along with the Brules and Oglalas in
this instance. In early 1879 the Oglalas began
building permanent structures at their new
Pine Ridge Agency under Red Cloud and the
Brules at their new Rosebud Agency under
Spotted Taip6 They had demonstrated skill
exercising diplomacy, tenacity, and nonviolent
resistance and had prevailed in selecting their
own sites for government Indian agencies. The
u.S. government, however, had not abandoned
its plans to further truncate the Great Sioux
Reservation.
As an adult Ohiyesa/Charles Eastman
interviewed Lakota, Nez Perce, Ojibway, and
Cheyenne leaders from this time and wrote
about them in his 1918 book, Indian Heroes and
Great Chieftains. 37 Eastman wrote that US.

Indian policy caused division within each tribe
between those who believed in resistance to the
US. Army's forced removal policy and those who
believed in accommodation, convinced that resistance would only result in extermination. These
two disparate responses to US. policy fractured
the traditional governance structure of tribes.
Traditionally, councils of leaders would establish
policy by consensus. Instead, in the 1860s through
1890s individual chiefs would lead their bands in
separate directions, although ultimately, virtually
every chief who survived would be forced by the
superiority of us. military technology and by
starvation conditions on reservations to give up
resistance. Eastman wrote about Lakota leader
Red Cloud of the Oglalas who refused to sign the
Fort Laramie Treaty of 1868 until the US. Army
met his conditions: Red Cloud insisted that the
army dismantle forts it had built on Lakota land
and abandon a new road it was building across
Indian land into the Black Hills-the Powder
River Road or Bozeman Trail. The forts and
the road were in violation of earlier treaties and
therefore illegal. Red Cloud told Eastman that he
signed only when the treaty
distinctly stated that the Black Hills and the Big
Horn were Indian country, set apart for their
perpetual occupancy, and that no white man
should enter that region without the consent
of the Sioux. Scarcely was this treaty signed,
however, when gold was discovered in the
Black Hills, and the popular cry was : "Remove
the Indians!"
Betrayed by the commissioners, Red Cloud fought
the US. Army for eight years, from 1868 to
1876, rather than be forced upon a reservation or
removed to Indian Territory. In the end he was
captured, imprisoned, and removed to Pine Ridge
Agency, where he lived until his death in 1909,
giving up any hope for successful resistance against
the technology of the Euro-Americans. 38
On the reservation Red Cloud experienced
the U.S. government elevating Spotted Tail to
"head chief" because he had been the earliest
Lakota leader to agree to live on a reservation.
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This undermining of Lakota/Dakota polity,
which recognized the political power of councils of leaders and was not hierarchical, was
standard operating procedure for U.S. Indian
policy. The agent in charge of the reservation
threatened Red Cloud with arrest and repeatedly undermined his authority, especially
after Red Cloud charged a resident white
trader with larceny, notified Washington
of shortfalls in rations, and petitioned for
citizenship for his people. The agent set up his
own agency council that excluded Red Cloud,
another violation of the horizontal decisionmaking structure of the Lakota, according to
Ostler. 39
POPULAR CULTURE AND REFORMERS

By the 1880s Red Cloud's interest in citizenship for Indians was mirrored in the "scientific"
scholarly community. Historian Frederick
E. Hoxie, in Final Promise: The Campaign to
Assimilate the Indians, 1880-1920, identified
the optimism about Native Americans that
prevailed in the 1880s and 1890s as the new
academic discipline of anthropology prompted
study of native peoples around the globe
and theoretical constructs for understanding
"civilization." The Smithsonian Institution
established a Bureau of Ethnology in 1879, led
by founding director Maj. John Wesley Powell
(1834-1902). Powell believed, as did his mentor
Henry Morgan, that there were stages any
group had to pass through to achieve "civilization": savagery (foraging), barbarism (farming
land in common), civilization (individualized
farming), and enlightenment (industrialization). While a professor at Illinois Normal
University, Powell had testified to the U.S.
House Indian Affairs Committee in 1874: "The
sooner this country is entered by white people
and the game destroyed so that the Indians
will be compelled to gain a subsistence by some
other means than hunting, the better it will
be for them." He advocated individual land
tenure, citizenship, and total assimilation as
the best way to help Native Americans move
along his trajectory to "civilization."40
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In the 1880s, supported by the encouragement of the "scientific" conclusions of anthropologists, the interests of railroads, the
military, and white settlers converged in support of a policy of assimilation, integration,
and individualization of Indian landholdings.
Hoxie concludes that the assimilation/integration policy was rooted in the optimistic
(and perhaps naive) belief that indigenous
peoples would pass through the "stages of
development" and attain "civilization" if the
policies toward them nurtured and reinforced
this development. Clearly it was also rooted
in the self-interests of each group involved.
Railroads in their competition for transcontinental routes sought to lay track across
reservation land and also to entice settlers to
locate towns along their routes; it was well
known in railroad circles that local trade was
what kept railroads solvent. The military was
generally weary of Indian wars that seemed
virtually over by 1880. Whites moving west
with the railroads wanted to settle land they
viewed as "unused," reservation land, and land
free of "hostiles."
In 1880 Native Americans controlled a land
mass one and a half times the size of California,
managing that land with their own political
and legal systems and maintaining economic
self-sufficiency. But the rapidly growing white
population in the west was eclipsing the native
population in numbers. In Dakota Territory in
1870 Indians had outnumbered whites by two
to one; ten years later, in 1880, whites outnumbered Indians six to one. 41
The overwhelmingly white Indian reform
movement also tended to support replacing
reservations, which separated native people
from the majority population, with assimilation, citizenship, integrated education, and
individual land allotments. The 1880s saw the
birth of dynamic advocacy groups addressing the need to reform Indian policy. Several
reform groups formed in 1879 after the press
reported stories of native groups walking north
from their assigned new location in Indian
Territory to their ancestral lands and being
confined in western forts and denied food
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when they refused to return to their assigned
reservation. Ponca leader Standing Bear and
Omaha Suzette LaFlesche and her brother
Joseph LaFlesche toured eastern cities that fall,
telling large audiences how terrible conditions
were on reservations and calling for Indians
to receive citizenship and for reservations to
be disbanded. The Boston Indian Citizenship
Committee, the Women's National Indian
Association, and, by 1882, the Indian Rights
Association all formed in response, their goal
being to reform Indian policy.42
Annually from 1883 to 1919 Indian reformers
met at a New York resort on Lake Mohonk to
spend three days discussing Indian policy. The
Lake Mohonk annual conferences brought an
informal coalition of Indian reformers together
with members of the government-appointed
voluntary Board of Indian Commissioners. By
the mid-1880s the reformers at Lake Mohonk
advocated allotment of 160 acres for each head
of household on each reservation. They recommended extending civil service reform to
reservation employment and extending state,
territorial, and local laws to cover Indians just
like the rest of US. residents.43 They also advocated establishing a system of Indian schools to
teach the ways of the white middle class.
Congress had funded Indian education
since 1811 by giving money to religious organizations that set up schools as part of their
mission work; virtually no schools for Indians
were government owned. But that changed in
1879. From 1879 to 1894 government funding
for Indian schools grew from $75,000 a year
to more than $2 million, and twenty government-operated off-reservation boarding schools
were established along with dozens of agency
schools. A superintendent of Indian education
was appointed to oversee this new educational
bureaucracy in 1882.44 Over the decade of the
1880s a centralized Indian education program
would require children to attend school, provide
them common textbooks keyed to set grade
levels, and place teachers and administrators
under civil service regulations-the goal being
both to professionalize Indian education and to
reduce tribal influence on Indian children.45

PARTISAN POLITICS AND INDIAN POLICY

In 1871, three years into the Fort Laramie
Treaty, a member of the US. House of Representatives added a rider to an appropriations
bill that said there would be no further treatymaking with Native American nations. He was
responding to some disgruntled members of the
House jealous that the Senate alone had the
power to make agreements related to so much
western land. Some in Congress anticipated
that the House and Senate would expand considerably with formation of new western states.
Senate approval of the bill with its rider ushered in a major change in Indian policy-treaties made by the executive branch and ratified
by the Senate were replaced by "agreements"
approved by both houses of Congress. Congress
was now an equal player with the executive
branch in Indian policy making. Although the
terms of treaties negotiated and ratified before
1872 remained in effect, these treaties were
routinely violated by subsequent "agreements"
that further reduced Indian land and by agents
who looked the other way as whites settlers
surged west onto Indian land. However, the
little-noticed change that Congress adopted
in 1871, to go into effect in 1872, would have a
profound impact on Indians by canceling their
status as independent nations and emphasizing
that they were "wards" of the U.S. government. 46 Henceforth both houses of Congress
would legislate Indian policy, tying Indian
policy to the partisan politics of the US. twoparty system.
No longer would Native Americans be considered foreign nationals. But what were they?
The Fourteenth Amendment added to the
Constitution in 1868 had made all people born
in the US. citizens except Indians. What legal
rights did Native Americans have as tribal
entities or as individuals? What power did
treaties have that were already ratified by the
US. Senate? The answers to these questions
would unfold over the next several decades in
bills passed by Congress and in Supreme Court
decisions and would amount to a steady erosion
of the legal rights of Native Americans.
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When the Democrats retook the presidency
in 1885-1889 and again in 1893-97, with Grover
Cleveland in the White House both times,
the former system of rewarding political contributors with federal appointments, including
appointments to be Indian agents, returned.

A young Anglo woman teaching among the
Sioux, Elaine Goodale, visited Indian agencies in
1885 and complained that the U.S. government
service was filled with Democrats who had no love
for the red man. "[T]heir attitudes sometimes suggested the kind of smiling tolerance one displays
toward a pair of precocious-and occasionally
troublesome-children," she wrote. Corruption
continued in the contracts for providing annuities,
she noted. She witnessed thirteen distributions of
annuities-typically a blanket for each man, a
quilt for each woman, and some cloth for dresses.
Elaine Goodale wrote that "these goods were
nearly worthless and a burden to the recipients,
who often threw them away or sold them for whatever they could get." High turnover among those
responsible for Indian agencies and politicization
of appointments meant that policy was continually modified, ineffectively policed, and reforms
barely implemented before they were altered or
abandoned.47
RETHINKING AND REDUCING
RESERVATIONS

The Fort Laramie Treaty of 1868 reserved
nearly 60 million acres of the Dakota Territory
for the Lakota/Dakota people .48 However,
beginning in 1871 the interests of the railroads
and the westward-moving public converged
and secured from the Republican majority in
Congress erosion of that treaty's guarantees
and of treaty rights across the board. Gradually,
incrementally, probably barely noted by most
members of the u.s. Congress, federal legislators through minor legislative actions dramatically altered U.S. Indian policy.49
Under the Fort Laramie Treaty the u.s. government promised to keep railroads and settlers
out of Indian land. Railroads, the major new
industry that was driving the u.s. economy in

FIG. 4. Elaine Goodale Eastman, c. 1893. Courtesy
of The Essential Charles Eastman (Ohiyesa), edited
by Michael Oren Fitzgerald (Bloomington, IN:
World Wisdom, 2007) .

the post-Civil War era, were in fierce competition for a northern transcontinental route. They
argued that it was essential that the railroads
be allowed to go directly through Lakota land
to link most efficiently industries and consumers on both coasts. Settlers must be allowed to
follow the rails and settle along rail routes. Then
the 'Black Hills were taken in 1876-77 under
President Grant's strategy as discussed above.
But the call for more land to be "liberated"
from the Lakota and other Plains Indians
increased in volume in the 1880s. By 1883
General Sherman reported, "I now regard the
Indians as substantially eliminated... . There
may be spasmodic and temporary alarms, but
such Indian wars as have hitherto disturbed
the public peace and tranquility are not probable."so In other words, settler expansion onto
more Indian land did not carry the risks it had
carried a decade earlier.
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The rationale of western settlers and congressmen was that the Indians were not using
their land. Homesteaders held 160 acres, but
Indians corporately held the equivalent of
1,000 acres apiece. Because they were not farming or ranching the land, the Indians should
lose their rights to it under "natural law."
Again, federally appointed commissions were
sent to negotiate agreements reducing Lakota
land, beginning in 1882 and continuing for
seven years. 51
During the decade of the 1880s Congress
considered three bills that would respond to
the growing consensus that reservations were
not working. Each bill called for dividing reservation land into individual 160-acre plots
assigned to native families, the surplus land
to be sold and the proceeds going to supply
the tribe with farming equipment and school
supplies. The first bill, the Coke bill of 1881,
gave tribes the right to decide what land would
be allotted and whether to retain some commonly owned land. It also would have made
those accepting allotments' US. citizens.52 The
second attempt to pass allotment came in 1884
and passed the Senate but not the House. That
was the year that the US. Supreme Court ruled
in Elk v. Wilkins that Indians could not vote
and were not citizens under the Fourteenth
Amendment. The Court argued that Elk, and
by extrapolation Indians generally, was born
on land that was not (yet) the United States,
and Congress had not established a process for
naturalizing Indians. 53 This decision muddied
the issue of citizenship. The third attempt to
pass an allotment bill, the Dawes Act, passed
Congress in 1887, stating that citizenship would
accompany the acceptance of allotments, but
without specifying any timetable or procedure
for how those who accepted allotments would
become voting citizens. Each proposed bill further limited the rights Congress was willing to
extend to native peoples.
Under the Dawes Act, the president had
authority to determine when a tribe's land
could be allotted. Land allotted could not be
sold or taxed for twenty-five years, a transitional
period to gradually ease Native Americans into

the economics of assimilation. 54 By 1887 US.
policy supported allotment of reservation land;
each head of household who would renounce
his tribal, collective right to reservation land,
would receive individual plots. The leftover land
would become public domain of the US. government and be offered as homestead plots to
settlers. This policy shift removed from Native
Americans millions more acres and added them
to the US. treasury. According to Indian policy
historian Henry E. Fritz, the allotment policy
enunciated in the Dawes Act "virtually condemned reservation Indians to poverty for many
generations."55 The intent, however, was more
benign, as argued by reformers and the chair of
the Indian Affairs Committee of the House. As
historian Hoxie explains, Republican senator
Henry Dawes from Massachusetts "believed
that reductions in the size of reservations would
bring the two races closer together and allow
American institutions-its schools, its political
system, and its expanding economy-to 'raise
up' the Indian."56 Allotment became so popular
with Friends of the Indian that while Thomas
Jefferson Morgan was the commissioner of
Indian affairs, he required that February 8, 1887,
the day the Dawes Act was signed into law, be
celebrated by all Indian schools as a holiday. 57
Even before allotment got underway, the
US. government during the decade of the
1880s removed millions of acres of land
from Native Americans through a series of
land cessions that disregarded treaties, and
reduced the size of the reservations of the
Lakota (Sioux), Crow, Blackfoot, Omaha, and
others.58 According to Hoxie, there were seven
major cessions of Indian land during the 1880s:
the Ute in Colorado in 1880, the Columbia and
Colville Reservation in Washington State in
1884 and 1892, Indian Territory in 1889, the
Great Sioux Reservation in 1889, the Blackfoot
and Crow in Montana in 1889, and the
Bannock-Shoshone in Idaho in 1889.59 Again,
the coalition of railroads, Christian reformers,
and the western settlers supported this policy.
What happened with the Lakota/Sioux is
illustrative of how land cessions worked elsewhere on the Plains. In late 1882 the Dakota

u.s. INDIAN POLICY,
territorial government sent a commission to
the Sioux agencies to secure the marks of male
heads of households on a paper authorizing
division of the Great Sioux Reservation into
separate, smaller reservations, but the idea
and the paper were abandoned in the face of
opposition from the Lakota and the Indian
Reform Association lobby. Six years later the
national government sought to persuade the
Sioux/Lakota to sign away another 11 million
acres of their land and divide the Great Sioux
Reservation into seven smaller reservations.
Earlier treaties required that three-fourths of
Lakota males agree to alterations in treaties.
The commission sent to the Lakota to secure
their agreement was asking them to accept
provisions it had already enacted into law.
Capt. Richard Pratt was dispatched to meet
with Sioux leaders at Standing Rock agency,
arriving on July 21, 1888, to get their signatures on this "agreement." He told them that
they must either accept the agreement or their
future would be "problematical and uncertain."
Historian Ostler writes that 600 Indians were
present from western agencies. Pratt and the
other commissioners talked for seven hours;
the Indians spoke for one hour and concluded,
"We will not sign those papers." It was summer,
they said, and they needed to return to their
fields since, unlike the commissioners, they
were not receiving a salary.6o To determine
their response to Pratt, the Lakota had met in
a council from which U.S. government representatives were excluded.

Lakota-speaking Elaine Goodale was included
in this meeting because "I was on their side," she

wrote. Her presence angered negotiator Pratt, who
called her to his office the next day and asked
what right had I to attend a secret council
to which no member of the commission had
access? I replied that I was there as a representative of the press. The Sioux leaders, in giving
me permission, had indicated their confidence
that I would report them fairly to the American
public. Capt Pratt then demanded whether I
had encouraged them to reject the government's

1865-1890
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offer, adding severely that so long was I was
to support whatever policy Washington chose to adopt. I said,
quite frankly, that I had taken no active part
in the discussions but . . . was not convinced
that they could not do better through further
negotiations. I added (not a little nettled): "I
am here solely in what I believe to be the best
interests of the Sioux and the fact of holding a
government position would never stand in the
way of expressing my honest opinions. Ifnecessary, I could always resign! "61
on the payroll I was bound

Pratt's mission failed. The Sioux united in
refusing this proposal. 62
The following year, 1889, Congress admitted North and South Dakota as states and
dispatched General Crook to get the Sioux
approval that Pratt had failed to secure.
Congress passed a new act raising the price
Indians would receive for their land from fifty
cents an acre to $1.25 an acre. Whatever had
not sold in ten years the U.S. government
would buy for fifty cents an acre. Allotments
would be increased to 320 acres from 160, and
those taking allotments would receive fifty dollars as well, up from the twenty dollars offered
by the Pratt Commission. Led by General
Crook, the Crook Commission remained in
Lakota territory from May 31 through August
7. Crook tried a softer approach, putting on
feasts and allowing tribal dances that churchnominated agents had prohibited on the reservations. But Crook's message was the same
as Pratt's had been: Congress will open the
reservations with' or without your approval, so
you are better off accepting this more generous
agreement. Crook promised to try to improve
the rations, increase the wages of Indian police
and judges, and secure better enforcement of
regulations prohibiting non-Indians from grazing their herds on Indian land. Subtly using
food as a weapon, Crook required Indians who
refused to sign to remain at Standing Rock
until agreement was reached-forcing them to
remain away from their fields and food crops
all summer. Ultimately the necessary threefourths of household heads signed, the first
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being Luther Standing Bear's father, Standing
Bear. The Lakota men voted 4,463 out of 5,678
eligible to vote to accept Congress's fait accompli. 63 The Great Sioux Reservation was broken
up into the Standing Rock and Cheyenne
River reservations in the north; Pine Ridge,
Rosebud, and Lower Brule to the south; and,
on the east bank of the Missouri, the Yankton
and Crow Creek. 64
They were not told that the U.S. government
had already decided to cut rations to Lakotas at
Pine Ridge and Rosebud by 20 to 25 percent
for the coming year, which brought an angry
delegation from the agencies to Washington
to meet with the secretary of the interior in
futile protest. That winter of 1889-90 was an
especially hard winter, and in February the
president declared remaining Sioux land open
for settlement. 6S
Historian Henry Fritz speculated that the
huge reservations could have been converted
to profitable ranches and Indians could have
been helped to form stock-raising associations,
but instead Indian land was drastically reduced
in size and Indians were al.1otted 160-acre tracts
that could not support farming and were too
small to support ranching. As this became
evident in the following decade, most of the
Christian reformers shifted their position,
still supporting allotment but arguing that the
reservation system itself was holding Indians
back; many of them escalated efforts to make
Indians full citizens and to end their dependency on the federal government. 66
WOUNDED KNEE: DECEMBER 1890
By the fall of 1890, Charles Eastman had completed medical school and was now Dr. Charles
Eastman, government physician to the Lakota
reservation at Pine Ridge in South Dakota. He
was one of the first Native American reservation
physicians, along with Mohave Apache Dr. Carlos
Montezuma and Omaha Dr. Susan La Flesche
Picotte. 67 Eastman arrived at Pine Ridge shortly
after a new agent arrived, political appointee Dr.
Daniel Royer, who replaced the popular agent
Valentine McGillycuddy.68 The new, inexperi-

enced Agent Royer would call in the army to stop
the Ghost Dance religious revival, misreading it
as evidence that the Lakota were about to resume
warfare against whites.
Another newcomer to Pine Ridge Agency that
fall was twenty-seven-year-old Elaine Goodale of
Massachusetts, supervisor of the sixty Sioux day
schools and a teacher who had traveled among
the Sioux. She knew about the Ghost Dance and
had interviewed an Indian man who had met
the prophet Wovoka, who started the religious
movement that was sweeping across the West. At
Pine Ridge Miss Goodale met Dr. Eastman, the
new reservation physician. Together they tried to
educate Agent Royer to what the drumming and
dancing really meant. Together they celebrated
Christmas. Together they heard the army firing on
the civilian Indian ghost dancers on December 29,
1890, killing between 200 and 300. Together they
cared for the injured in the agency chapel-cumhospital. Amidst the chaos of the Wounded Knee
Massacre they became vocal critics of the agent's
use of a military response against despairing civilians who were engaging in a widespread religious
revival. Their outrage fed the love developing
between them. Within six months Elaine Goodale
and Charles Eastman married. 69 Their continued
published and unpublished criticism of corruption on the reservations-of traders cheating the
Indians with shoddy goods or fewer goods than
they were paid to provide and of ignorant political appointees using agency jobs solely to advance
their careers-would ultimately end Charles's
career as a reservation physician. 7o
The military response to the Ghost Dance
at Pine Ridge Reservation demoralized even
those Lakota who supported assimilation as
the wisest response under the circumstances.
Luther Standing Bear, a graduate of Carlisle
Indian Industrial School who had returned to
the reservation to raise his family, wrote about
the Wounded Knee Massacre:
Men, women, and children-even babies
were killed in their mothers' arms! ... [Ilt
was not a battle-it was a slaughter, a massacre. Those soldiers had been sent to protect
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these men, women, and children who had
not joined the ghost dancers, but they had
shot them down without even a chance to
defend themselves. When I heard this, it
made my blood boil. I was ready myself to go
and fight then. There I was, doing my best to
teach my people to follow in the white men's
road-even trying to get them to believe in
their religion-and this was my reward for
it all! The very people I was following-and
getting my people to follow-had no respect
for motherhood, old age, or babyhood.
Where was all their civilized training?71
Gen. Nelson Miles shared the dismay of Luther
Standing Bear, Elaine Goodale, and Charles
Eastman at the military's behavior at Wounded
Knee, writing in a letter eleven months after
the massacre:
Wholesale massacre occurred and I have
never heard of a more brutal, cold blooded
massacre than that at Wounded Knee.
About two hundred women and children
were killed and wounded; women with little
children on their backs, and small children
powder burned by the men who killed
them, being so near as to burn the flesh and
clothing with the powder of their guns, and
nursing babes with five bullet holes through
themP
The year 1890 ended with Wounded Knee
and with a surprising announcement from the
superintendent of the'census, chief executive at
the Census Bureau:
Up to and including 1880, the country had
a frontier of settlement, but at present the
unsettled area has been so broken into by
isolated bodies of settlement that there can
hardly be said to be a frontier line. In the
discussion of its extent, its westward movement, etc., it can not, therefore, any longer
have a place in the census reportsJ3
The Great Plains, according to the U.S.
government's Census Bureau, had no more
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room for native peoples to settle other than
the barren areas assigned to them. It was the
beginning of a new era.
NOTES

1. Theodore W. Taylor, The Bureau of Indian
Affairs (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1984), 14.
Figure is for 1872.
2. Some historians hold that Congress had little
interest in Indian matters and provided little money
for Indians or Indian policy after 1877 when Indians
were no longer such a military threat. See Edmund
Jefferson Danziger Jr., Indians and Bureaucrats:
Administering the Reservation Policy during the Civil
War (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1974),
214.
3. Francis Paul Prucha, The Great Father: The
United States Government and the American Indians,
abridged edition (Lincoln: University of Nebraska
Press, 1986), 155.
4. Jeffrey Ostler, The Plains Sioux and U.S.
Colonialism from Lewis and Clark to Wounded Knee
(Cambridge, UK: Cambridge UniverSity, 2004),36;
Jerome A. Greene, Fort Randall on the Missouri,
1856-1892 (Pierre: South Dakota State Historical
Society Press, 2005), 8.
5. Ostler, Plains Sioux and U.S. Colonialism, 37.
6. Ibid., 41-42.
7. Ibid., 44.
8. Greene, Fort Randall, 88.
9. Ibid., 98-100, 103. Ostler in Plains Sioux and
U.S. Colonialism, says that in the early 1870s "capitalists who controlled the new tanning technologies
opened up new markets for hides. To satisfy these
markets, non-Indian hunters invaded the Plains,
armed with large-bore rifles equipped with telescopic sights and a range of several hundred yards.
Great Plains bison became the gun belts for the
British soldiers in India, drive belts for industrial
machinery in Liverpool, and luxury furniture in
Manhattan townhouses. Within a decade the animals were on the brink of extinction" (17).
10. Prucha, Great Father, 158.
11. Henry E. Fritz, The Movement for Indian
Assimilation, 1860-1890 (Philadelphia: University
of Pennsylvania Press, 1963), 74, 76, suggests Grant
wanted these agent jobs for his former military officers who needed employment.
12. Prucha, Great Father, 158, 160, 162, 164.
Frederick E. Hoxie, in Final Promise: The Campaign
to Assimilate the Indians, 1880-1920 (Lincoln:
University of Nebraska Press, Bison Books, 2001), 3,
notes that excluding Catholics alienated them and
deprived the Indian service of the religious group
with the most experience in the west.

46

GREAT PLAINS QUARTERLY, WINTER 2008

13. Lincoln replaced the death sentences with
prison terms for all but thirty-nine of those who
had been tried by quickie military courts in the
fall of 1862, and on December 26, 1862, thirtyeight were hanged at Mankato, the largest execution in U.S. history. Ohiyesa's father, captured
near the Canadian border, went to prison rather
than the gallows, although his family presumed
him dead. See Roy Meyer, History of the Santee
Sioux: United States Indian Policy on Trial (Lincoln:
University of Nebraska, 1993). Charles A. Eastman,
Indian Boyhood (1902; reprint New York: Dover
Publications, 1971), 245, 246, 247.
14. Agencies were the official headquarters of
the U.S. government on reservations. From these
agencies policy was carried out under the virtually
absolute rule of the agent in charge. The numbers
of agencies fluctuated as reservations were combined
and relocated.
15. Prucha, Great Father, 193.
16. Ibid.
17. Ibid., 195-97, 219.
18. Laurence Armand French, Native American
Justice (Chicago: Burnham Publishers, 2003), 138,
203.
19. Fritz, Movement for Indian Assimilation, 163.
20. Charles Eastman, From the Deep Woods to
Civilization: Chapters in the Autobiography of an
Indian (1916; Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press,
1977), 19, 21-23.
21. Ibid., 31-50.
22. Fritz, in Movement for Indian Assimilation, 127,
contended there were never more than 14,000 U.S.
soldiers in the Plains; the larger figure comes from
Clayton K. S. Chun's U.S. Army in the Plains Indian
Wars, 1865-91 (Oxford, UK: Osprey Publishing,
2004),5.
23. Fritz, Movement for Indian Assimilation, 111.
24. Ibid., 111, 113, 125, 127, 131, 132.
25. Hoxie, Final Promise, 108-9.
26. Prucha, Great Father, 175.
27. Ostler, Plains Sioux and U.S. Colonialism, 66.
28. Ibid., 59-62.
29. Ibid., 84; Philip S. Hall, To Have This Land:
The Nature of Indian/White Relations in South
Dakota, 1888-1891 (Vermillion: University of South
Dakota Press, 1991),3.
30. Ostler, Plains Sioux and U.S. Colonialism, 66.
31. Ibid., 71, and Waziyatawin Angela Wilson,
Remember This! Dakota Decolonization and the Eli
Thayer Narratives (Lincoln: University of Nebraska
Press, 2005).
32. Ostler, Plains Sioux and U.S. Colonialism, 85105, especially 86.
33. Eastman, From the Deep Woods, 53, 57, 58, 65.
34. Quoted in Ostler, Plains Sioux and U.S.
Colonialism, 113. See pp. 109-27 on these delegations,

their requests, and the promises made to them and
broken by presidents, cabinet officials, and legislators.
35. Ibid., 126.
36. Ibid., 119, 120, 126.
37. Charles Eastman, Indian Heroes and Great
Chieftains (1918; New York: Dover Publications,
1997), includes fifteen portraits, notably Lakota
chiefs Red Cloud, Sitting Bull, Spotted Tail, Crazy
Horse, Tamahay, Gall, American Horse, Rain in
Face, and Two Strike; the Dakota Little Crow; the
Nez Perce Chief Joseph; Cheyennes Dull Knife,
Roman Nose, and Little Wolf; and Ojibway/
Chippewa Hole-in-the-Day.
38. Ibid., 8-10.
39. Ostler, Plains Sioux and U.S. Colonialism,
69. Agent Valentine McGillycuddy deposed Red
Cloud in early summer 1880, and after Red Cloud
reported on corruption and larceny at the agency,
McGillycuddy formed an agency council from
which Red Cloud was excluded (see pp. 203-12 for
an extended discussion).
40. Hoxie, Final Promise, 17,22,24.
41. Ibid., 42, 43, 46.
42. Ibid., 7-11.
43. William T. Hagan, The Indian Rights Association: The Herbert Welsh Years, 1882-1904 (Tucson:
University of Arizona Press, 1985), 34; Taylor,
Bureau of Indian Affairs, 22.
44. Hoxie, Final Promise, 53.
45. Ibid., 63, 65, 68.
46. Joyotpaul Chaudhuri, "American Policy: An
Overview" in American Indian Policy in the Twentieth
Century, ed. Vine Deloria Jr. (Norman: University
of Oklahoma, 1985), 25-26; Fritz, Movement for
Indian Assimilation, 84, 85.
47. Fritz, Movement for Indian Assimilation, 151,
156; Prucha, Great Father, 190; Kay Graber, ed.,
Sister to the Sioux: The Memoirs of Elaine Goodale
Eastman (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press,
1978), 34, 63.
48. Hall, To Have This Land, 3.
49. John Marshall, the first chief justice of
the U.S. Supreme Court, had ruled in Johnson v.
McIntosh (1823), Cherokee Nation v. Georgia (1831),
and Worcester v. Georgia (1832) that "Indian inhabitants are to be considered merely as occupants, to
be protected, indeed, while in peace, in the possession of their lands, but to be deemed incapable of
transferring the absolute title to others" (McIntosh);
that Indians are domestic dependent nations under
the domination of the United States (Cherokee
Nation); and "The constitution, by declaring treaties already made, as well as those to be made,
to be the supreme law of the land, has adopted
and sanctioned the previous treaties with Indian
nations, and consequently admits their rank among

u.s. INDIAN POLICY, 1865-1890
those powers who are capable of making treaties"
(Worcester). Marshall's decisions, while somewhat
ambiguous, laid the foundation of u.s. Indian law,
according to Chaudhuri, ''American Policy," 23-25.
50. Fritz, Movement for Indian Assimilation, 113,
131; Prucha, Great Father, 171, 175, 179.
51. Hall, To Have This Land, 8-11.
52. Hoxie, Final Promise, 71, 72.
53. Ibid., 75.
54. Ibid., 70, n.
55. Fritz, Movement for Indian Assimilation, 213.
56. Hoxie, Final Promise, 50. Charles A. Eastman
and Luther Standing Bear later supported the allotment policy because they believed it would give
Indians rights at a time that they had virtually
none, foremost the rights of citizenship. There were
clear parallels to the discussions in Congress and
among reformers at the end of the Civil War over
how to protect four million newly freed people. Give
them land or give them citizenship was the debate
then, and the belief in citizenship won, supported by
Frederick Douglass, among so many others. Twenty
years later a majority of reformers and Friends of
the Indian, including leading Native Americans,
believed that allotment with the promise of citizenship and the vote trumped the right to land. The
difference was that Native Americans would receive
160 acres per head of household whereas African
Americans received no land at all. For Eastman
and Standing Bear and their fathers, this was the
best choice given the devastating conditions on
reservations and the hopelessness of further military
resistance.
57. Lucy Maddox, Citizen Indians: Native American Intellectuals, Race, and Reform (Ithaca, NY:
Cornell University Press, 2005), 18.
58. Hoxie, Final Promise, 48-51.
59. Ibid., 44.
60. Ostler, Plains Sioux and U.S. Colonialism, 223,
226,228.
61. Graber, Sister to the Sioux, 91.
62. Prucha, Great Father, 214.
63. Ibid., 215-16. Luther Standing Bear tells
about his father signing first in My People, the Sioux
(Lincoln: University of Nebraska, 1975),210-15.
64. There is confusion in the literature about the
smaller reservations Crow Creek, Lower Brule, and
Yankton. Ostler, Plains Sioux and U.S. Colonialism,
314, does not show Yankton on his map of the
reduced Sioux land, and Yankton is not even in his
index. Greene, Fort Randall, includes Yankton since
it was the reservation closest to Fort Randall, but

47

he is not clear how the 1889 land cession affected
Yankton, which had already had surveyors sent in to
begin allotment a year earlier.
65. Ostler, Plains Sioux and U.S. Colonialism,
223-39.
66. Fritz, Movement for Indian Assimilation, 214.
67. Peter Iverson, Carlos Montezuma and the
Changing World of American Indians (Albuquerque:
University of New Mexico Press, 1982); Benson
Tong, Susan La Flesche Picotte, MD: Omaha Indian
Leader and Reformer (Norman: University of
Oklahoma Press, 1999). Charles Eastman's autobiography, From the Deep Woods to Civilization (1916)
recounts his educational progress.
68. For a much more critical perspective on
McGillycuddy and his conflict with Red Cloud, see
Ostler, Plains Sioux and U.S. Colonialism, 203-12.
McGillycuddy decentralized distribution of annuities, excluded Red Cloud from leadership at Pine
Ridge despite his peers naming Red Cloud as their
leader, used annuities to manipulate the chiefs, and
threatened frequently to bring in U.S. troops.
69. Proceedings of the Fourth Annual Lake Mohonk
Conference (Philadelphia: Indian Rights Association,
1887),2,4-5; Graber, Sister to the Sioux, 116, 119.
70. Raymond Wilson's biography of Eastman,
Ohiyesa: Charles Eastman, Santee Sioux (Urbana:
University of Illinois Press, 1999), continues to be
the most comprehensive study, and it details these
years.
71. Charles Eastman was at Pine Ridge as agency
physician during the murder of Sitting Bull and the
Ghost Dance revival and Wounded Knee Massacre,
and wrote extensively about it; Gertrude Bonnin/
Zitkala Sa was also present but never mentioned
either event in her writings, according to Cathy N.
Davidson and Ada Norris in their introduction to
Zitkala Sa's American Indian Stories, Legends, and
Other Writings (New York: Penguin Books, 2003),
xxxiii. The quote is from Standing Bear, My People,

the Sioux, 224.
72. Nelson A. Miles to George W. Baird, November 20, 1891, Baird Collection, WA-5901, M596,
Western Americana Collection of the Beinecke
Rare Book Collection and Manuscript Library,
Yale University, quoted in French, Native American

Justice, 197.
73. Danielle Lynn Tisinger, "Western Imaginings:
Native and White-American Western Literature,
1887-1934" (PhD diss., University of Minnesota, June
2004), 2, includes this quote from the 1890 U.S.
Census Bureau.

